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Bloom's synthesis of the materialist and nationalist accounts of
the civil rights movement is more credible than either taken separately, an4, though it may not completely rout the competing elitistideological account, to which Bloom devotes little attention, it does
show the persuasive power of a coherent alternative account. It deserves consideration by a wide audience.

CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN AMERICA: ESSAYS
ON THE SEPARATION OF POWERS. By Charles Hardin.I Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press. 1989. Pp.
236. $27.95.
Robert G. Kaufman 2
Is there something seriously wrong with the American political
system? Many observers think so. Most can agree on some or all of
the symptoms of the problem: the weakening of political parties,
the diffusion of power within Congress, the erosion of presidential
authority, the growing influence of special interests, money, and
lobbyists, a burgeoning bureaucracy largely beyond executive or
congressional control, political gridlock between a predominantly
Republican presidency and a Democratic congress. Yet no consensus exists about the solution.J
Reformers fall into two distinct groups, which sharply disagree
about the requisite reforms. Moderate critics defend the principle
of separation of powers, the existence of three independent political
institutions with separate constitutional standing. They argue
against constitutional change, and wish instead to revise the "Unwritten Constitution," those customs and arrangements that enable
a government of separate institutions to function, such as the internal arrangements of the Congress. 4
Others argue, however, that the separation of powers is the
root cause of America's constitutional problems. Charles Hardin is
a longtime advocate of this more radical challenge to the existing
system. Drawing on the analysis of constitutional scholar Charles
Mcilwain, Hardin argues, in this compilation of essays which summarizes his extensive work on the subject, that the separation of
I. Professor Emeritus of Political Science, University of California, Davis.
2. Assistant Professor of Political Science, Colgate University.
3. For a sound journalistic assessment of these problems, see H. SMITH, THE POWER
GAME: How WASHINGTON WORKS (1987).
4. D. PRICE, AMERICA'S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION (1983).
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powers is a threat to constitutionalism itself: it prevents us from
finding an effective way of replacing an incapacitated president who
has failed politically; it fosters deadlock and lack of accountability
by hopelessly dividing authority between legislative and executive
branches; it promotes the interests of "iron triangles" and special
interests over the national interest; it precludes the formulation and
implementation of an effective foreign policy. He suggests that we
adopt some variant of the parliamentary system, which unifies executive and legislative authority, eliminates fixed-calendar elections,
allows for elections at the discretion of the government-of-the-day,
and establishes the procedure of removing failed executives by votes
of no confidence.
Although Hardin offers some compelling criticisms of the separation of powers, his argument for abolishing the principle ultimately fails. Separation of powers has not worked perfectly, but it
has given us two hundred years of stable and effective government.
Hardin's "cure" would impose costs which we should not and
would not accept. He rests his case for parliamentary democracy
on an excessively restrictive view of the purposes of constitutional
government. His case also rests on the dubious premise that parliamentary systems have performed better than our system. The evidence he marshals in support of this premise, particularly in the
realm of foreign affairs, is unpersuasive, because Hardin's policy
preferences overwhelm his objectivity.
Like many who make the case against separation of powers,
Hardin combines two distinct, though interrelated, lines of argument. One is rationalist: separation of powers is inconsistent with
the imperative of making policy rationally, decisively, and efficiently; whatever rationality separation of powers may have had in
the relatively simple world of the framers, it is outmoded in today's
dangerous and interdependent world.
The other line of argument is liberal. Before Watergate and
the paralyzing debate over the Vietnam War, many argued that the
separation of powers thwarted the large and active role that the federal government should play in expanding the welfare state. This
led some to advocate a stronger (presumably liberal) presidency and
a weaker (presumably obstructionist) congress.s Thereafter, however, the rationale shifted as reformers sought to restrict an Imperial Presidency which supposedly had brought about the Watergate
crisis and the Vietnam debacle.
S. For this classification of the rationalist and liberal arguments against separation of
powers, I owe James Q. Wilson. See, e.g., Wilson, Does the Separation of Powers Still Work?,
PUB. INTEREST, Winter, 1987, at 36, 37-39.
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Hardin argues, on the one hand, that the separation of powers
has allowed "iron triangles" of congressmen, special interests, and
bureaucrats to deadlock arms control negotiations and other critical
foreign policy initiatives. From this perspective, it makes sense to
strengthen the power of the president. Yet he also argues that the
separation has "deified" the presidency, led to government by
"presidential whim," and institutionalized "a constitutional flaw of
first importance" because it precludes the replacement of a president who has become politically disabled. Such arguments are consistent with the rationalist case against the separation.
In discussing the foreign policy implications of separation of
powers, however, Hardin's arguments are also consistent with the
post-Watergate liberal critique of the Imperial Presidency. Thus,
he blames Ronald Reagan and the military-industrial complex for
the breakdown of arms control negotiations during the early 1980s,
negotiations whose virtues he considers self-evident. Similarly, he
blames hawks in Congress and iron triangles for blocking the SALT
II Treaty of 1979, another arms control endeavor which, according
to Hardin, was obviously in the national interest. His treatment of
the CIA and the Vietnam War also reflects the post-Vietnam liberal
agenda.
There are ample grounds to dispute Hardin's rationalist case.
The framers did not consider efficiency an absolute value; hence,
they established a system based on the separation of powers, or
what Richard Neustadt more accurately describes as separate institutions sharing powers, which protected against the tyranny of the
majority, or of a faction, or of the national government. Nor have
conditions changed so dramatically as to render the framers' concerns and solutions frivolous. George Washington and Abraham
Lincoln faced problems no less daunting than today's budgetary
and security issues. The separation of powers is still the main bulwark protecting individual and community rights from abuse by a
powerful federal government. Hardin devotes too little attention to
these competing concerns.
There are even more substantial grounds for rejecting Hardin's
liberal interpretation of current events. Because much of his critique focuses on foreign affairs, his tendentiousness on the subject
deserves special mention. Consider his discussion of arms control.
It is not self-evident, to this writer among many others, that the
SALT II Treaty whose failure Hardin laments did not deserve to
fail. If the treaty was a bad one, then perhaps its defeat vindicated
our traditional system.
Similarly, events have demolished the premises and arguments
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of Hardin's essay on the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START)
between 1981 and 1985. Both Hardin and Strobe Talbott, on whose
questionable journalistic account of the negotiations Hardin relies,
regard the breakdown of arms control negotiations between 1981
and 1985 as a disaster attributable to the American stance on such
negotiations. 6 Why? Reagan's success in achieving the Intermediate Ranged Ballistic Missile (INF) Treaty of 1987 on terms Talbott
and others thought impossible seems to vindicate the very negotiating stance that Hardin condemns. Furthermore, Hardin and Talbott misread the motives of those who persuaded President Reagan
to take his hard and successful line. It was the policy attitudes of
men like Richard Pedes and Casper Weinberger, not the "iron triangle," that were the main reason for the Reagan Administration's
successful arms control strategy.' Thus, the outcome of the Reagan
Administration's phase of nuclear arms talks may stand as another
example of how separation of powers works. Our system implements only those goals that can survive a process of protracted bargaining and consultation, and this apparent weakness spared the
United States a hasty and ill-advised arms treaty on less favorable
terms.
Hardin fails to demonstrate that a parliamentary system would
perform better. He concedes that Britain's experience is "critical to
the evaluation of parliamentarianism," which by his own admission
raises some difficulties for his argument. Samuel Beer, S.E. Finer
and others have argued that the parliamentary system was one of
the causes of the rise of Great Britain's socialist welfare state, the
convergence on collectivism of the political parties, and concomitant social and economic problems. Hardin offers a plausible rebuttal of this indictment.
Hardin, however, does not stop there: "even if Great Britain
were to go broke tomorrow, its record ... might still make it an
exemplary one, superior to the American system." Have parliamentary democracy in general and Great Britain's variant in particular more effectively addressed major problems, such as deficits,
economic policy, and foreign policy? The evidence does not support this assertion. Neither Great Britain nor most parliamentary
democracies have deficits smaller than ours, measured as a percentage of GNP.s Similarly, our aggregate economic performance com6. S. TALBOTI, DEADLY GAMBITS (1984). For a compelling criticism of the book and
its methods, see Draper, Journalism. History, and Journalistic History, N.Y. Times, Dec. 9,
1984, (Review of Books) at 3.
7. For an excellent inside account of the negotiations, see K. ADELMAN, THE GREAT
UNIVERSAL EMBRACE: ARMS SUMMITRY- A SKEPTIC'S ACCOUNT (1989).
8. Wilson, supra note 5, at 44-47.
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pares favorably to most of our parliamentary competitors,
particularly during the 198Qs.9
Nor does the record of American foreign policy compare unfavorably to that of parliamentary democracies. Again, Hardin attributes too many of our mistakes to the particulars of our
constitutional system rather than to the flaws inherent in all democracies. Consider his argument that the inability to replace a politically disabled president is a major flaw in our system relative to
parliamentary systems. Sometimes this inability is, to be sure, a disadvantage-recall Woodrow Wilson's incapacity after his series of
strokes. Sometimes, parliamentary systems have benefited from the
ability to replace a politically disabled leader-recall the replacement of Neville Chamberlain during the Nazi invasion of France.
Sometimes, Congress has gone too far in constraining presidential
authority in foreign affairs-consider the Neutrality Legislation of
the 1930s, and the War Powers Act of 1974. Overall, however, parliamentary systems have done no better and often considerably
worse. British foreign policy has suffered from grave mistakes no
less frequent or persistent than ours: appeasement during the
1930s, the Suez adventure, and several aspects of post-war
decolonization.
Hardin gives American foreign policy too little credit. His
apocalyptic tone suggests a system on the brink of crisis. This is
false. Despite obvious problems, we enjoy a remarkable prosperity.
Anyone pondering the case for constitutional reform must consider
the extraordinary success of the American post-war policy of containing communism. True, some believe that the policy of global
containment rested on an exaggerated estimate of the Soviet threat,
or produced counterproductive excesses in American foreign policy.
Even granting this, we deserve great credit for maintaining the postwar system at less cost and risk than the history of this century and
the record of peacetime democracies, including Great Britain,
would have given anyone the right to expect. Who would have predicted, at the onset of the Cold War, that we would manage to bring
its end in sight on terms favorable to the West? We achieved this
outcome against an implacable ideological adversary, a military colossus, without having to fight another world war. This is a record
which any parliamentary democracy should envy.w
Even if we assume that a parliamentary system could have
9. For a more optimistic assessment of the relative performance of the U.S. system, see
1. NYE, BoUND TO LEAD: THE CHANGING NATURE OF AMERICAN POWER, 201-30 (1990).
10. For a similar, although more qualified, argument along these lines, see J. GADDIS,
THE LoNG PEACE 21 5-35 (1987).
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done as well, the record suggests that our constitutional procedures
can produce a largely successful foreign policy in perilous circumstances, without jeopardizing individual liberty.
Granted, our system could use some fundamental reform. A
combination of the weakening of political parties and dilution of the
president's authority vis-a-vis Congress, and the diffusion of authority within Congress, has excessively fragmented the power and responsibility necessary for effective government. We probably
should strengthen presidential and congressional leadership, to help
reverse "the tides of individualization and decentralization that
have engulfed the Congress."11 As James Q. Wilson has written,
however, "it is in this area of the unwritten constitution that remedies for the defects of the separation of powers must be found.
There are no constitutional remedies short of the abolition of the
principle itself, and that is a price that two hundred years of successful constitutional government should have taught us is too high
to pay."I2

REFORM AND REGRET: THE STORY OF FEDERAL
JUDICIAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE ALABAMA
PRISON SYSTEM. By Larry W. Yackle.1 New York,
N.Y.: Oxford University Press. 1989. Pp. xii, 322. $35.00.
Elizabeth Alexander2
As a decidedly minor character in the drama, I read Professor
Larry Yackle's history of the Alabama prison litigation with special
interest. This litigation arguably set the mold for most of the significant "conditions of confinement" litigation. Professor Yackle's
treatment of it is both thorough and accurate. He shares with me a
deep ambivalence about the outcome of the litigation, which can
now be read as a cautionary tale about the limitations of litigation
as an instrument for meaningful social reform.
The book begins by describing the horrible conditions in the
Alabama prison system at the time the litigation began, including
the filthy, overcrowded punishment cells known as dog houses
where prisoners were deprived of clothing, light, and running water.
· ll.
12.
l.
2.
Liberties

Wilson, supra note 5, at 52.
/d. at 52.
Professor of Law, Boston University.
Associate Director for Litigation, National Prison Project of the American Civil
Union Foundation.

